History of Singapore | 1998 is a close-up history of the year when the Asian Financial Crisis pushed Singapore into recession, Electronic Road Pricing replaced the older manual road-pricing schemes, PUB began the work that would become NEWater, maritime authorities strengthened ship reporting in the Straits, and the Government introduced large support and cost-cutting packages to keep firms and workers afloat.
1998 is one of the clearest modern examples of Singapore under economic stress.
The crisis had begun in the region in 1997.
By 1998, the shock had reached Singapore more deeply.
Real GDP fell by 2.2%, according to later Monetary Authority of Singapore summaries.
Retrenchments rose sharply.
Companies faced weaker regional demand, financial stress and pressure to cut costs.
The response was not to close Singapore off from the world.
It was to reduce domestic costs, protect capability, improve infrastructure and prepare for recovery.
For the longer chronology, continue through History of Singapore | 700 Years of Fully Connected History, the Singapore Atlas and the Singapore Knowledge Hub.
Why 1998 Matters in Singapore History
1998 matters because it shows the difference between a shock and a collapse.
Singapore was hit hard by the regional crisis.
But its financial institutions did not collapse in the way seen in some neighbouring economies.
That gave the Government room to act.
Monetary policy was eased.
A $2 billion off-budget package was introduced in June.
A much larger $10.5 billion cost-cutting package followed in November.
Employers, workers and unions were asked to accept painful adjustments to restore competitiveness.
At the same time, the country kept modernising transport, water and maritime systems.
This is why 1998 should not be remembered only as recession.
It was recession plus redesign.
The Asian Financial Crisis Reaches Singapore
The Asian Financial Crisis began with sharp currency and financial-market instability in 1997 and spread across the region.
Singapore entered the crisis with stronger banks and external reserves than many neighbours.
That did not make it immune.
Singapore depended heavily on regional trade, electronics, finance, investment and tourism.
When neighbouring economies weakened, demand fell.
When investors became cautious, capital flows changed.
When currencies moved sharply, relative business costs shifted.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore later summarised the crisis period by noting that real GDP fell 2.2% in 1998 after several years of much faster growth.
The lesson is structural.
A small open economy can remain financially sound and still suffer when the wider region contracts.
Trade openness is not a shield.
It is a channel.
June and November 1998: Two Major Economic Response Packages
The Government first introduced a $2 billion off-budget package in June 1998.
As conditions worsened, a much larger $10.5 billion cost-cutting package followed in November.
Later Ministry of Finance speeches described the combined objective clearly: reduce business costs, protect employment and preserve the economy’s ability to recover when external demand returned.
Measures included tax and levy reductions, wage restraint and changes affecting CPF employer contributions.
These measures were painful.
Workers had to accept lower overall labour costs and a reduction in employer CPF contributions.
Businesses had to keep operating through weak demand.
Government revenue was also affected by the downturn.
The crisis response therefore depended on tripartite cooperation among Government, employers and unions.
Retrenchment Makes a National Recession Personal
Macroeconomic contraction appears first as a percentage.
For a household, recession appears as lost income.
MOF later recorded 29,100 retrenchments in 1998.
That number matters because unemployment is not spread evenly.
One worker keeps a job.
Another loses one entirely.
One firm survives.
Another closes.
National averages can therefore hide very uneven human outcomes.
This is why training, wage policy and temporary cost relief become social questions as well as economic questions.
1 April 1998: Electronic Road Pricing Launches
On 1 April 1998, Singapore launched Electronic Road Pricing.
The Land Transport Authority describes ERP as a congestion-management system based on charging motorists according to road usage and traffic conditions.
LTA’s historical timeline records 33 gantries in the initial system and notes that ERP replaced the older Area Licensing Scheme and Road Pricing Scheme.
The change is important because it turned road pricing from a manual or semi-manual restriction into an electronic system.
Vehicles carried in-vehicle units.
Gantry technology detected passing vehicles.
Charges could vary by place and time.
This allowed pricing to become more precise.
ERP Is a Behaviour System, Not Only a Payment System
The purpose of ERP is not mainly to collect revenue.
It is to change behaviour.
A driver can avoid a priced road.
Travel earlier or later.
Take public transport.
Combine journeys.
Choose a different route.
This is congestion pricing.
The economic idea is simple.
Road space at peak hour is scarce.
A price encourages some demand to move elsewhere in time or space.
1998 therefore marks a major step in Singapore’s history of using technology and prices together to manage scarce urban capacity.
ERP Also Shows How Technology Changes Administration
The older Area Licensing Scheme depended heavily on physical licences and enforcement.
ERP automated much of the transaction.
That reduced transaction friction but increased dependence on electronics, gantries, vehicle units and backend systems.
Automation therefore did not remove administration.
It moved administration into software and infrastructure.
This pattern would later appear across Singapore in electronic payments, digital government and Smart Nation systems.
1998: PUB Begins the NEWater Study
In 1998, PUB set up a team to test the latest membrane technology for reclaiming treated used water for potable purposes.
PUB’s NEWater history traces the modern programme directly to this 1998 study.
This was not Singapore’s first attempt at water reclamation.
The idea had been explored in the 1970s.
What changed was technology.
Membranes had become cheaper and more reliable.
International experience had expanded.
Singapore therefore returned to an old problem with better tools.
This is an important innovation lesson.
An idea can be correct before technology is ready.
1998 was the moment Singapore tried again.
19 May 1998: A New Ship-Reporting System for the Straits
On 19 May 1998, the International Maritime Organization adopted a joint proposal by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore for a mandatory ship-reporting system in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore records the adoption as one of its 1998 milestones.
This system improved the information available about vessels moving through one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors.
The Straits are narrow, crowded and strategically important.
Ships carry oil, containers, bulk cargo and passengers through them.
Mandatory reporting helps authorities know who is moving where.
Information reduces collision risk and improves traffic management.
A Crisis Year Can Still Be an Infrastructure Year
1998 is important because Singapore did not freeze every long-term project during recession.
ERP launched.
NEWater research advanced.
Maritime traffic systems improved.
Economic reform continued.
This is what government across timescales looks like.
Today’s recession requires relief.
Tomorrow’s city still requires investment.
Stopping all future-building can make a downturn easier today and recovery weaker tomorrow.
1998 in One Simple Timeline
- 1 April: ERP launches.
- 19 May: IMO adopts the mandatory ship-reporting proposal for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
- June: Government introduces a $2 billion off-budget package.
- 1998: PUB begins the modern NEWater membrane study.
- November: Government introduces a $10.5 billion cost-cutting package.
- 1998 overall: real GDP contracts by 2.2% and retrenchments rise sharply.
What Changed in 1998 — and What Continued
- Changed: Singapore entered recession during the Asian Financial Crisis.
- Changed: ERP replaced older road-pricing systems.
- Changed: the modern NEWater programme began its testing phase.
- Changed: regional maritime traffic management became more information-rich.
- Changed: major cost-reduction packages altered wages, CPF contributions and business costs.
- Continued: Singapore remained committed to openness and international trade.
- Continued: long-term infrastructure planning continued during short-term crisis.
A Student’s Way to Read 1998
Use one word: buffer.
Fiscal capacity buffered recession.
Tripartite cooperation buffered labour-market stress.
ERP buffered road congestion by changing demand.
NEWater research aimed to create a future water buffer.
Ship reporting improved the information buffer against maritime risk.
Buffers do not remove problems.
They create room to respond.
Frequently Asked Questions
Did Singapore enter recession in 1998?
Yes. Later MAS material records a 2.2% fall in real GDP in 1998 during the Asian Financial Crisis.
When did ERP start?
Electronic Road Pricing launched on 1 April 1998.
When did the modern NEWater project begin?
PUB set up a team in 1998 to test modern membrane technology for water reclamation.
What crisis packages were introduced in 1998?
The Government introduced a $2 billion off-budget package in June and a $10.5 billion cost-cutting package in November.
Helpful Reading
- Singapore Knowledge Hub
- LTA | ERP and road management
- PUB | NEWater journey
- MPA | Maritime milestones
- MOF | Retrospective on 1998 crisis measures
The Asian Financial Crisis Was a Regional Chain Reaction
The crisis did not begin because Singapore suddenly forgot how to run banks or factories. It began as confidence, currency and debt problems spread through a tightly connected region.
Thailand’s currency crisis was followed by severe stress in Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and other economies. Exchange rates moved sharply. Companies with foreign-currency debt found repayment more difficult. Banks became cautious. Investors pulled back. Regional demand weakened.
Singapore’s stronger banking system reduced the risk of a domestic financial collapse, but the real economy was still exposed. Factories sold into Asian markets. Hotels depended on regional visitors. Shipping, finance and business services depended on healthy neighbouring economies.
This is why the phrase “contagion” became common during the crisis. Financial fear can spread across borders even when the original problem began elsewhere.
For students, the lesson is that networks transmit both value and stress. A trade network carries exports in good times. The same network carries falling demand in bad times. A financial network channels investment in good times. The same network can accelerate capital flight in a panic.
Why Singapore Did Not Simply Devalue Aggressively
During regional currency crises, one obvious question is whether a country should sharply weaken its own currency to make exports cheaper.
Singapore’s monetary framework was different from systems that targeted an interest rate alone. The Monetary Authority of Singapore managed the Singapore dollar against a basket of currencies, using the exchange rate as the main monetary-policy tool.
In 1998, MAS eased the policy stance as the economy slowed and inflationary pressure disappeared.
The challenge was balance.
A weaker currency could support competitiveness.
Too much instability could damage confidence in Singapore as a financial centre.
Policy therefore tried to absorb the regional shock without creating a second crisis in the Singapore dollar.
This is another reminder that economic policy is usually optimisation under constraints rather than one obvious “correct” move.
The CPF Cut Was a Competitiveness Tool With Household Consequences
One of the most difficult parts of the 1998 cost-cutting response involved labour costs and CPF contributions.
From the employer’s perspective, lower contribution costs could make it cheaper to retain workers during a recession.
From the worker’s perspective, lower employer contributions meant less money flowing into long-term CPF savings.
That trade-off is important.
A policy can help protect employment while still imposing a real cost on employees.
The Government and unions therefore had to explain why a temporary reduction in labour cost might protect a larger number of jobs.
This is where tripartism becomes practical rather than ceremonial. Employers want lower costs. Workers want security and fair compensation. Government wants the economy to recover without unnecessary social damage.
The 1998 crisis forced those interests into the same room.
Why 29,100 Retrenchments Mattered
Retrenchment statistics become more meaningful when translated into household systems.
A retrenched worker may have a mortgage.
Children in school.
Parents to support.
Skills suited to an industry that is shrinking.
The shock therefore travels from the labour market into housing, education, health and family decisions.
This is why economic resilience cannot be measured only by GDP. A country can recover statistically while individual families take much longer to recover financially or psychologically.
The 1999 recovery would reduce retrenchments sharply, but 1998 remained the year when the human cost of the crisis became most visible.
ERP Was the Digital Successor to an Older Singapore Idea
Singapore did not invent congestion pricing in 1998.
The Area Licensing Scheme had already charged vehicles for entering congested central areas from the 1970s.
What ERP changed was precision and automation.
Instead of displaying a paper licence and relying heavily on manual enforcement, motorists could be charged automatically when passing gantries.
The system could vary prices by time and location.
That made road pricing more responsive to actual traffic conditions.
In systems terms, ERP turned a policy rule into machine-readable infrastructure.
The rule was still human: congested road space should carry a price.
The technology made the rule easier to apply repeatedly at scale.
Road Pricing and Rail Investment Belong Together
Charging motorists makes more sense when alternatives exist.
If people are asked to avoid driving at peak hour, public transport must be capable enough to absorb some of the change.
Singapore’s road-pricing history therefore cannot be separated from MRT and bus history.
One system discourages excessive peak road use.
The other systems provide alternatives.
This is policy complementarity.
A single policy can look unfair or ineffective if the supporting system is missing.
1998’s ERP launch belongs inside the larger transport machine that LTA had been created to coordinate in 1995.
1998 Was the Year Singapore Reopened an Old Water Question
The NEWater story is often associated with its public launch in 2002.
The real modern turning point came earlier.
In 1998, PUB formed a team to test whether improved membrane technology had finally made large-scale water reclamation practical.
This matters because innovation is often nonlinear.
An idea may fail commercially in one decade and become transformative in another.
The underlying problem — water scarcity — had not disappeared.
The technology had changed.
That changed the solution set.
For students, this is a powerful lesson: revisit important problems when tools improve.
The Maritime Reporting System Was Regional Safety Infrastructure
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are among the world’s most important sea lanes.
They are also geographically constrained.
Large ships moving in opposite directions need predictable traffic rules and good information.
The 1998 IMO adoption of the joint reporting proposal by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore demonstrated a regional approach.
No single coastal state could manage the entire waterway alone.
Ships cross multiple jurisdictions in one voyage.
Safety therefore depends on shared procedures.
This is the maritime equivalent of cross-border air-traffic coordination.
The Crisis Accelerated Financial-Sector Reform
Singapore’s financial institutions survived the Asian Financial Crisis relatively well.
That did not lead policymakers to conclude that no reform was needed.
Instead, the crisis increased urgency around liberalisation, competition and modern regulation.
Over the following years, Singapore would open more of banking to competition, liberalise stockbroking commissions and restructure its exchanges.
The later formation of SGX in 1999 belongs partly to this reform sequence.
This is why annual chronology matters.
1998 owns the stress.
1999 owns much of the institutional renewal.
1998 as a Lesson in Temporary Measures
Crisis policy creates a danger of permanence.
A tax concession introduced during recession can become politically difficult to remove.
A CPF cut can help employers during crisis but weaken long-term retirement accumulation if left indefinitely.
MOF later emphasised that the 1998 cost-cutting packages were emergency measures, not the intended permanent norm.
This distinction is essential to good policy.
Emergency systems need exit ramps.
A measure that is sensible for recession can become harmful after recovery.
From 1998 Into 1999
The annual chain becomes very clear here.
1998 records recession, cost cutting and high retrenchment.
1999 records recovery, falling retrenchments and a renewed reform agenda.
1998 starts the modern NEWater study.
2000 brings the full-scale demonstration plant.
1998 launches ERP.
Later decades refine and eventually replace its technology.
History is easier when the reader can watch systems change state year by year.
1998 and the Difference Between Competitiveness and Austerity
Cost cutting can sound like a simple instruction to spend less.
The 1998 packages were more specific.
The goal was to reduce the cost of doing business in Singapore relative to regional competitors whose currencies had fallen sharply.
This involved taxes, levies, wages and CPF contributions.
The logic was not that lower costs are always better.
It was that a temporary competitiveness gap during crisis could cause viable firms to relocate or close.
If enough productive capacity disappeared, recovery would become much harder.
That is why emergency cost reduction was paired with a longer-term intention to restore normal arrangements after recovery.
Why Singapore’s Reserves Mattered Even Before They Were Drawn Directly
Financial reserves matter partly because they create credibility.
A government with strong reserves can support the economy without immediately losing market confidence.
It can fund temporary measures.
It can absorb lower revenue during recession.
It can prepare contingency spending if conditions worsen.
Singapore’s crisis response therefore rested not only on the measures announced in 1998, but on years of earlier fiscal accumulation.
This is another example of invisible preparation becoming valuable only when a shock arrives.
The NEWater Study Was Counter-Cyclical Thinking
Starting a major water-technology study during recession is historically revealing.
Short-term economic weakness did not remove long-term water vulnerability.
Singapore still needed more resilient water sources for the decades ahead.
PUB therefore continued solving a structural problem even while the wider economy was under stress.
This is what strategic continuity looks like.
Crisis changes priorities.
It should not erase every priority whose payoff lies farther in the future.
What 1998 Teaches About Recovery
Recovery is easier when three things survive a crisis.
- productive capability;
- institutional trust; and
- room to adapt.
Singapore’s 1998 response tried to preserve all three.
Cost measures tried to keep firms and jobs viable.
Monetary stability tried to preserve confidence.
Infrastructure and reform created room for the next growth phase.
1999 would show the rebound.
1998 explains why the rebound had something to build on.
Why 1998 Is a Useful Comparison With 2009 and 2020
Singapore would face major shocks again in 2009 and 2020.
The causes were different.
1998 was a regional financial crisis.
2009 followed a global financial crisis.
2020 was a pandemic shock.
Yet the response architecture shows recurring habits.
Use fiscal space.
Protect viable firms and employment.
Adjust policy quickly as evidence changes.
Keep long-term infrastructure moving.
Then restore more normal settings when the emergency passes.
1998 is therefore an early modern reference point for Singapore’s crisis-management style.
The Deepest 1998 Lesson: Flexibility Has to Be Built Before the Shock
Singapore could not create financial reserves, tripartite institutions, a capable civil service or transport-planning expertise after the crisis had already peaked.
Those capacities had to exist beforehand.
This is the paradox of resilience.
It is built during ordinary years but valued during abnormal ones.
The same logic applies to students.
Revision done before an examination feels repetitive.
Its value appears only when the test starts.
1998 shows national preparedness working the same way.
Why 1998 Still Matters to Singapore’s Economic Memory
The Asian Financial Crisis became a reference point for later policymakers because it showed how quickly regional stress could damage Singapore even without a domestic banking collapse.
It also demonstrated that recovery depends on choices made during the downturn.
If firms are allowed to fail unnecessarily, productive capacity disappears.
If workers lose attachment to employment for too long, skills can erode.
If confidence in the currency or institutions is damaged, recovery becomes harder.
The 1998 response therefore aimed to preserve the platform from which growth could restart.
That basic logic reappeared in later crises, even when the specific tools changed.
The Year Also Shows Why Technology Policy Can Survive Recession
ERP and NEWater both depended on technological confidence.
One used electronics to manage congestion.
The other explored membranes to expand water supply.
Neither project solved the recession.
Both solved structural problems that would still exist after recovery.
This is why 1998 belongs in the history of innovation as well as crisis.
A capable state does not confuse “urgent” with “important”.
It has to manage both.
A Final 1998 Connection: Crisis Reveals the Architecture Under Growth
Fast growth can hide the machinery that makes growth possible.
A crisis exposes it.
Financial reserves become visible because spending power is suddenly needed.
Tripartite institutions become visible because wages and jobs must be negotiated under pressure.
Monetary credibility becomes visible because currency confidence matters.
Transport pricing becomes visible because scarce road space still has to be managed even during recession.
Water research becomes visible because structural scarcity does not disappear when GDP falls.
The year therefore teaches a simple principle: prosperity is not one number. It rests on institutions, infrastructure and accumulated capability underneath the number.
1998 temporarily weakened the number.
The deeper architecture remained strong enough for recovery.
The strongest way to remember 1998 is to see it as a test of whether earlier institution-building had created enough room to manoeuvre. Singapore could not stop the regional crisis, but it could adjust monetary settings, reduce costs, use fiscal capacity, preserve business capability and continue structural projects. That combination of short-term defence and long-term investment is what made the later rebound possible.
In other words, 1998 did not prove that Singapore was crisis-proof. It proved that crisis readiness is the ability to absorb damage without losing the systems needed for recovery.
One Last Way to Read 1998
A crisis year is easiest to misunderstand when later recovery makes the danger look smaller than it felt at the time. In 1998, policymakers did not yet know exactly how fast Asia would recover, which firms would survive, or whether external demand would return quickly. The value of the year lies in decisions made under that uncertainty. Measures were designed to buy time, protect competitiveness and preserve options. ERP and NEWater work also show that Singapore did not allow one urgent problem to consume every long-term priority. Economic history therefore becomes more useful when we ask not only what happened to GDP, but what capabilities remained intact when GDP fell.
How the 1998 Crisis Reached Ordinary Singaporeans
The Asian Financial Crisis is often explained through currencies, banks and GDP.
Families experienced it through very different signals.
A parent might hear that overtime had been cut.
A neighbour might be retrenched.
A business owner might delay expansion because orders had fallen.
A graduate might discover that the job market had become much more difficult within a few months.
A household might postpone a renovation, holiday or large purchase because confidence had weakened.
These small decisions matter because recession can feed on itself.
When households spend less, businesses receive less revenue.
When businesses receive less revenue, they may cut hiring or investment.
That can make households even more cautious.
Government support packages therefore tried to interrupt this downward loop without pretending Singapore could control the whole regional crisis.
Why Tripartism Mattered More During Recession
Singapore’s tripartite model joins Government, employers and unions in regular negotiation.
During normal growth years, cooperation can feel procedural.
During recession, interests become harder to reconcile.
Workers want wages and job security.
Employers want lower costs and flexibility.
Government wants firms to remain viable without creating unnecessary hardship.
The 1998 cost-cutting measures required all three sides to accept that no group could obtain everything it wanted.
This is what a social compact looks like under pressure.
It is not the absence of conflict.
It is a mechanism for managing conflict without allowing it to destroy the larger system.
The Crisis Changed How Singapore Thought About Productivity
Cutting wages and costs can help temporarily.
It cannot be a permanent growth strategy.
A higher-income Singapore had to compete through productivity, technology, skills and higher-value activity rather than becoming the cheapest location in Asia.
The Asian Financial Crisis therefore reinforced a long-term transition.
Short-term competitiveness measures protected the economy during stress.
Long-term competitiveness required better workers, better systems and higher-value industries.
This is why education, retraining and industrial upgrading remained important even when the immediate debate focused on costs.
ERP Was an Early Smart-City System Before the Phrase Became Popular
In later decades, Singapore would use the phrase “Smart Nation”.
ERP shows that digital urban management had much older roots.
The system linked vehicles, stored-value payment, roadside gantries and central administration.
Instead of asking officers to inspect physical licences, machines handled the transaction automatically.
This made road pricing more scalable.
It also generated data about traffic and pricing effects.
The deeper lesson is that digital government often begins with a very practical problem.
How do we charge road use more precisely?
How do we reduce administrative friction?
How do we change behaviour without building another road?
ERP answered those questions with technology, pricing and regulation combined.
Roads Are Scarce Even When Land Is Not Physically Gone
Congestion is a scarcity problem.
The road still exists.
The scarce resource is usable road capacity at a particular time.
At 3am, the same road may have plenty of capacity.
At 8am, it may not.
ERP therefore prices time-sensitive scarcity.
This makes it a useful Economics lesson for students.
The physical object is unchanged.
Its value changes with demand.
NEWater Research Shows Why National Strategy Needs Patience
The 1998 NEWater study would not produce a mass public milestone for several years.
That makes it easy to overlook in a simple timeline.
But long-term resilience often begins quietly.
Researchers test membranes.
Engineers measure reliability.
Economists evaluate cost.
Health experts examine water quality.
Only later does the public see bottles of NEWater.
That sequence is useful for students because it shows the invisible phase before innovation becomes famous.
Most important systems spend years being boring before they become transformative.
The Maritime System Was Another Network Under Stress
Singapore’s port remained essential during the crisis.
Trade volumes can fall, but ships still need safe routes.
Oil still moves.
Food still arrives.
Containers still connect factories and consumers.
The mandatory ship-reporting initiative therefore belongs to resilience as much as maritime safety.
Better information reduces uncertainty in a crowded waterway.
That is exactly what stressed systems need.
1998 Was a Test of Institutional Credibility
During crisis, citizens and investors watch institutions closely.
Will the currency remain stable enough?
Will banks remain sound?
Will policy change suddenly?
Will the Government respond to unemployment?
Will firms continue investing?
Credibility cannot be created overnight during a panic.
It is accumulated through earlier policy, reserves, regulation and institutional behaviour.
1998 made that accumulated credibility economically valuable.
Why the 1998 Story Is Bigger Than Economics
The crisis affected education choices, family plans, careers and public confidence.
ERP changed daily driving behaviour.
NEWater research changed future resource security.
Maritime reform changed how one of the world’s busiest sea lanes was managed.
This is why annual history should not isolate “the economy” from “the city”.
Economic stress and infrastructure reform happened to the same people in the same year.
A Final 1998 Learning Frame
Ask four questions.
- What was the external shock?
- What domestic capability already existed?
- What temporary response was used?
- What long-term reform continued anyway?
For 1998, the answers are unusually clear.
External shock: Asian Financial Crisis.
Existing capability: strong institutions, reserves, tripartism and infrastructure.
Temporary response: stimulus and cost reduction.
Long-term reform: transport pricing, water technology, maritime safety and financial-sector renewal.
History of Singapore | 1998
Singapore in 1998 was under pressure.
The economy contracted.
Thousands lost jobs.
Costs were cut.
But the country kept building.
Road pricing became electronic.
Water recycling moved back onto the national agenda.
Maritime monitoring improved.
The best way to remember the year is simple.
Protect today.
Prepare tomorrow.
Continue forward: History of Singapore | 1999
Continue backwards: History of Singapore | 1997